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Illegal Stops and the Exclusionary
Rule: The Consequences of Utah v.
Strieff
Emily J. Sack*

In December, 2006, an anonymous caller left a message on a
police drug tip line saying that there was “narcotics activity” at a
particular house in South Salt Lake City.1 As a result of the tip,
Officer Douglas Fackrell conducted “intermittent surveillance” of
the home over the course of one week for a total of “approximately
three hours.”2 In that period, the officer observed “short term
traffic” at the home, with visitors arriving and leaving again
within a couple of minutes.3 Though the traffic was not “terribly
frequent,” Officer Fackrell believed that it was more than typical
for a residence, and was “frequent enough that it raised [his]
suspicion.”4
Officer Fackrell observed Edward Strieff leave the house,
though he had not seen Strieff’s arrival.5 The officer followed
Strieff in an unmarked car, as Strieff walked down the street
toward a convenience store.6 As he approached the store, Officer
Fackrell ordered Strieff to stop in the parking lot.7 Strieff
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.
1. State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015), rev’d sub nom. Utah
v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at 13 (U.S. June 20, 2016).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. State v. Strieff, 286 P.3d 317, 320 (Utah Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 357
P.3d 532 (Utah 2015), rev’d sub nom. Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at
13 (U.S. June 20, 2016).
7. State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015), rev’d sub nom. Utah
v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at 13 (U.S. June 20, 2016).
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complied and Officer Fackrell identified himself as a police
officer.8 He explained that he had been watching the house
because he believed it was a source of drug activity, and then
asked Strieff what he was doing there.9 Officer Fackrell also
requested Strieff’s identification, which Strieff provided, and then
relayed the information to police dispatch, asking them to check
for outstanding warrants.10 When dispatch conveyed that Strieff
had an outstanding “small traffic warrant,” the officer arrested
Strieff on the warrant and searched him incident to arrest.11 The
search uncovered a baggie of methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia in Strieff’s pockets.12
Strieff was charged with unlawful possession of
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia; he moved to suppress
the evidence, arguing that it was the fruit of an illegal stop.13 The
State conceded that Officer Fackrell had stopped Strieff without
reasonable articulable suspicion because he did not see Strieff
enter the house, did not know how long he had been there, and
knew nothing of him other than that he left the house.14
However, the State argued that the evidence should not be
suppressed because the existence of the valid arrest warrant
attenuated the connection between the illegal stop and the
discovery of the evidence.15 The trial court denied the motion to
suppress, and Strieff conditionally pled guilty to reduced charges,
reserving his right to appeal the trial court’s denial of the
8. Id.
9. Id. The record does not seem to indicate what, if anything, Strieff
said in response. At the oral argument, addressing this point with Strieff’s
lawyer, Justice Alito noted, “Well, we really don’t know very much about
exactly what happened here, which is unfortunate . . . . [W]e don’t even know
what your client said.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Utah v. Strieff,
No. 14-1373, slip op. (U.S. 2016). Strieff’s lawyer followed:
[A] really important part of the officer’s testimony was that he didn’t
remember what that answer was. So if my client had said, I went in
there because there’s someone who’s ill and I’ve been visiting for, you
know, 20 minutes, or . . . this is where my friend lives; that’s why I
was there, end of inquiry, and . . . the warrants check shouldn’t have
been run. A reasonably well-trained officer should know.
Id. at 45.
10. Strieff, 357 P.3d at 536.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 536–37.
15. Id. at 537.
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motion.16 Utah’s intermediate court affirmed, but the Utah
Supreme Court reversed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to “resolve disagreement about how the attenuation
doctrine applies where an unconstitutional detention leads to the
discovery of a valid arrest warrant.”17 In a 5–3 opinion, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the attenuation exception
to the exclusionary rule applied to the case, and that the evidence
here should not be suppressed because the discovery of a valid
arrest warrant broke the causal chain between the illegal stop and
the discovery of the drug evidence on Strieff.18
Strieff stands at the crossroads of two highly controversial
criminal procedure issues—the scope of the exclusionary rule and
the legitimacy of police stop-and-frisk protocols—and it is likely to
have a significant impact in both areas. The Court took a further
step in its continuing limitation of the exclusionary rule through a
broad interpretation of its attenuation exception.19 Further, by
holding that evidence obtained through an illegal stop will be
admissible when the suspect has an outstanding arrest warrant,
the Court granted the police broad discretion to stop first, and
develop a legitimate basis for an arrest and search later.20 The
Court refused to acknowledge the major consequences of this
decision for police-citizen relations—particularly in poor and
minority areas—provoking an angry dissent by Justice Sotomayor,
who explicitly linked the exclusionary rule doctrine and the

16. Id.
17. Strieff, slip op. at 6.
18. Id. at 13. Justice Thomas wrote the Court’s opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. Id. at 3. Justice
Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ginsburg joined in part.
Id. Justice Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ginsburg also
joined. Id. Utah v. Strieff was argued just nine days after the death of Justice
Scalia, on the first day of oral arguments since his death. See Andrea
Garland, Utah at the United States Supreme Court Without Scalia, 29 UTAH
B.J. (2d ser.)10, 10 (May–June 2016). As it turned out, Justice Scalia’s vote
would not have changed the outcome in the case. However, given his opinion
in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), see infra text accompanying
notes 43–49, we can speculate that his presence may have moved the Court
even further in limiting the exclusionary rule. See Orin Kerr, Opinion
Analysis: The Exclusionary Rule Is Weakened but It Still Lives, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 20, 2016, 9:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinionanalysis-the-exclusionary-rule-is-weakened-but-it-still-lives/.
19. See Strieff, slip. op. at 10.
20. See id. at 9 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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impact of police misconduct on the street for our citizens.21
I.

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, ATTENUATION DOCTRINE AND THE
RULE’S PURPOSE

To understand the developments in Strieff, it first is
important to explore briefly the trajectory of the exclusionary rule
since its recognition by the Court early in the twentieth century.
In Weeks v. United States, in discussing the use of evidence
obtained illegally by the police, the Supreme Court said:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and
held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and
seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials
to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great
principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.22
The Court thus held that evidence obtained from an
unconstitutional search or seizure in a federal case must be
excluded from use in a criminal trial.23
It extended the
exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, holding that:
[I]n extending the substantive protections of due process
to all constitutionally unreasonable searches—state or
federal—it was logically and constitutionally necessary
that the exclusion doctrine—an essential part of the right
to privacy—be also insisted upon as an essential
ingredient of the right . . . . To hold otherwise is to grant
the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment.24
21. See id. at 12.
22. 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
23. Id. at 398.
24. 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961). In Wolf v. Colorado, the Court held
that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states through the Due Process
Clause, but declined to find that the exclusionary rule must also be applied to
state prosecutions. 338 U.S. 25, 27–29 (1949). The Mapp Court overruled
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The Court subsequently held that the scope of the
exclusionary rule extended not only to evidence obtained as a
direct result of a Fourth Amendment violation, but also evidence
that is derived from its illegality, the “fruit of the poisonous
tree.”25
The Mapp Court repeatedly referenced the Constitution as
the basis for the exclusionary rule, indicating that it considered
this remedy to be constitutionally required.26 For example, in
discussing Weeks, the Court in Mapp referred to the exclusionary
rule as a “clear, specific, and constitutionally required—even if
judicially implied—deterrent safeguard without insistence upon
which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to ‘a form
of words.’”27
The Court referred to its “holding that the
exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments,”28 and discussed the “constitutional
exclusionary doctrine.”29
However, in the years after Mapp, the Court began to disavow
the constitutional basis for the rule, instead referring to it as a
“judicially created remedy.”30 Though the Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Constitution “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of
evidence obtained in violation of its commands.”31 If suppression
is just a “judicially created rule,”32 rather than a constitutional
requirement, then the courts have greater discretion to limit its
application. This change in characterization was part of the
process by which the Court limited the scope of the rule, and
began to recognize several exceptions to its application. Three of
these exceptions concern the causal relationship between the
constitutional violation and the evidence obtained—the

that portion of Wolf to hold that the states must adhere to the exclusionary
rule to suppress illegally obtained evidence. 367 U.S. at 654–55.
25. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963); see also
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (quoting Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
26. 367 U.S. at 648.
27. Id. (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,
392 (1920)).
28. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657.
29. Id. at 659.
30. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
31. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995).
32. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139−40 (2009).
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independent source doctrine, the inevitable discovery doctrine,
and the attenuation doctrine.33 Under the independent source
doctrine, evidence obtained in an unlawful search may be
admitted if it also was acquired lawfully from a separate,
independent source.34 The inevitable discovery doctrine permits
admission of illegally obtained evidence if it inevitably would have
been discovered lawfully.35 Under the attenuation doctrine,
illegally obtained evidence may be admitted when the connection
between the constitutional violation and the evidence is broken by
an intervening circumstance, thus ‘“dissipat[ing] the taint.’”36
Though the evidence may not have been discovered but for illegal
police conduct, the question for attenuation is whether the
evidence “‘has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.’”37
Just as the Court’s characterization of the source of the rule
changed over time, it also began to narrow the identified purposes
for the rule. Like the change in source, this narrowing of purpose
also had the effect of limiting the rule’s scope and application. In
Mapp, the Court made clear that there were multiple purposes for
the exclusionary rule. The Court identified deterrence of police
misconduct as one important reason.38 If the evidence obtained
from an illegal search or seizure were not admissible, this would
jeopardize convictions; therefore, wanting to avoid this outcome,
police would refrain from illegal conduct.39 However, the Court
also noted that the exclusionary rule was required because of “the

33. Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at 4 (U.S. June 20, 2016)
(citations omitted).
34. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (quoting Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)); see Segura v. United States, 468 U.S.
796, 805 (1984) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392 (1920)); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963).
35. Nix, 467 U.S. at 432, 443−44 (emphasis added).
36. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
37.
Id. at 487−88 (quoting MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).
Though not discussed in the Court’s opinion in Utah v. Strieff, in prior
opinions the Court has repeatedly stated that the prosecution has the burden
of proving the admissibility of the evidence. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
604 (1975); see Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 (2003).
38. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
39. Id. at 648 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392).
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imperative of judicial integrity.”40 As the Court put it in Wong
Sun v. United States, suppression of illegally obtained evidence
protected Fourth Amendment rights both by deterring lawless
conduct by officers, and by “closing the doors of the . . . courts to
any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained.”41 Reliance upon
such illegally obtained evidence would taint the judicial process,
by condoning the exploitation of constitutional violations.
However, in later cases, the Court began to drop the judicial
integrity rationale, concentrating solely on the deterrence
explanation for the exclusionary rule.42 In Hudson v. Michigan,
writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained the dependency
of the exclusionary rule on deterrence.43 Because the exclusionary
rule has “substantial social costs,” it is applicable only where the
benefits of deterrence outweigh these costs.44 As the Court put it
in Davis v. United States, “[t]he rule’s sole purpose, we have
repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment
violations.”45 As commentators have noted, this sole focus on
deterrence has made it possible to limit the application of the
exclusionary rule.46 If exclusion is not likely to deter an officer’s
behavior, under this theory there is no other plausible purpose for
excluding the evidence involved. Hudson, the 2006 decision
written by Justice Scalia, may indicate most clearly the use of the
deterrence rationale to limit the application of the exclusionary
rule, which he said “has always been our last resort, not our first

40. Id. at 659.
41. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486; see also Brown, 422 U.S. at 599 (“These
considerations of deterrence and of judicial integrity, by now, have become
rather commonplace in the Court’s cases.”); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S 338, 357 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that judges should
“avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness.”).
42. Donald A. Dripps, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment Forty
Years Later: Toward the Realization of an Inclusive Regulatory Model, 100
MINN. L. REV. 1885, 1899 (2016); Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A
Counter-Narrative of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV.
1555, 1574–75, 1606 (2015); George C. Thomas III, Mapp v. Ohio: Doomed
from the Beginning?, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 294–97 (2014) (citing
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347).
43. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 594−97 (2006).
44. Id. at 591 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)).
45. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011) (citations
omitted).
46.
See Ristroph, supra note 42, at 1606–07; Thomas, supra note 42, at
291.
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impulse.”47 Justice Scalia argued that though deterrence is
necessary for exclusion, it is not sufficient, since “the value of
deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit
the forbidden act.”48 He said that we should not assume that
exclusion in one context is “necessary deterrence simply because
we found that it was necessary deterrence in different contexts
and long ago.”49
Though the Strieff Court did not completely abandon the
exclusionary rule, it did continue to undermine it; though it
claimed to be applying existing attenuation doctrine, its reasoning
significantly broadened the exception.
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ATTENUATION EXCEPTION

A threshold question for the Court was whether the
attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule was even the
appropriate doctrine to consider in this case. The trial court and
Utah Court of Appeals had both upheld the admission of the
evidence based on their interpretation of the attenuation
exception to the exclusionary rule.50 However, in reversing the
lower courts, the Utah Supreme Court first held that the
attenuation doctrine did not apply to this case, reasoning that the
U.S. Supreme Court had applied the doctrine only where there
were intervening circumstances “involving a defendant’s
independent acts of free will.”51 Such independent acts would
include a defendant’s voluntary confession or consent to a
search.52 Unlike such acts, the discovery of an outstanding
warrant is neither initiated by the defendant, nor an independent
act. In addition, it is an entirely foreseeable event arising out of
the stop or arrest, so it cannot be viewed as “sufficiently removed
from the primary illegality.”53 The Utah Supreme Court found
that the inevitable discovery exception did apply to these facts,
47. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591.
48. Id. at 596.
49. Id. at 597. Justice Scalia went on to explain the changed
circumstances since Mapp which made the exclusionary rule less necessary,
which included increased deterrence that comes from the development of civil
remedies for citizens claiming violations by the police, as well as the
increased professionalism of police forces. Id. at 597−99.
50. State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536, 537 (Utah 2015).
51. Id. at 544−45.
52. Id. at 544.
53. Id. at 545.
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but held that here the exception was not satisfied.54 The Utah
court said that the doctrine was implicated in the case, because it
involved two parallel acts of police work—the stop which was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment; and the execution of the
outstanding warrant, which was lawful.55 However, the doctrine
requires that “the fruits of the lawful investigation would
inevitably have come about regardless of the unlawful search and
seizure.”56 Though the arrest and search incident to arrest here
were lawful, they were the result of the unlawful stop, and it
would be “difficult at best” to show such inevitability because “we
cannot know whether Strieff might ultimately have had this
contraband in his possession on any future date on which he may
have been arrested on the outstanding warrant.”57
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Utah
Court in quick order.58 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas
rejected the view that the logic of prior Supreme Court cases
relating to attenuation was limited to independent acts by the
defendant.59 Finding that the attenuation doctrine was the
appropriate framework to consider whether the evidence should
be excluded in this case, the Court applied three factors first
identified in the attenuation case of Brown v. Illinois.60 To
consider whether or not the attenuation exception was satisfied,
the Court looked to the “‘temporal proximity’” between the
unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of the evidence; ‘“the
presence of intervening circumstances;’” and ‘“the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct.’”61
III. THE BROWN ATTENUATION ANALYSIS

A. Warrants and the Meaning of Intervening Circumstances
The Court conceded that the first factor, temporal proximity
between the illegal conduct and the discovery of the evidence,
54. Id. at 544, 545.
55. Id. at 545.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 546.
58. Apparently the defendant also had not pressed this argument at the
U.S. Supreme Court. See Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at 5 (U.S. June
20, 2016).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 5−6 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975)).
61. Id. at 5−6. (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 603−04).
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argued in favor of suppression, since the officer discovered the
drugs just minutes after the illegal stop of the defendant.62
The Court also did not spend much time on the second and
more controversial factor, the presence of intervening
circumstances, finding that it “strongly favors the State.”63 Here,
the warrant was valid; moreover, it predated the officer’s
investigation and was entirely unrelated to the stop.64 Once he
knew of the warrant, the officer had an obligation to make the
arrest; this was “independently compelled” by the pre-existing
warrant, and after a lawful arrest, it clearly was lawful to perform
a search incident to arrest.65
However, both Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor
explained in their dissents why this was not an appropriate
application of the intervening circumstances factor in attenuation
analysis; both argued that the warrant was not an independent
intervening factor that dissipated the taint of the illegal stop.
Justice Sotomayor distinguished the circumstances in Strieff
from the classic attenuation case of Wong Sun v. United States.66
In Wong Sun, an individual, who days earlier had been illegally
arrested, voluntarily returned to the police station to confess to a
crime.67 Though the illegal arrest was a “but for” cause of the
confession, the police did not exploit the illegal action to obtain the
confession, and the Court held that the confession could be
admitted into evidence.68 Referring to the Court’s opinion in
Wong Sun, Justice Sotomayor stated, “[w]e reasoned that a Fourth
Amendment violation may not color every investigation that
follows but it certainly stains the actions of officers who exploit
the infraction.”69
The Brown factors distinguish evidence
obtained through innocent means from that obtained by exploiting
misconduct. Here, she argued, there was no intervening innocent
conduct.70 The officer stopped Strieff illegally and immediately

62. Id. at 6.
63. Id. at 6−7.
64. Id. at 7.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 3−4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963)).
67. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491.
68. Id.
69. Strieff, slip op. at 4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 5.
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checked for a warrant.71 Justice Sotomayor noted that the
“discovery of [the] warrant was not some intervening surprise that
[the officer] could not have anticipated;”72 she pointed out that
Utah had over 180,000 misdemeanor warrants in its database and
the county involved had a large backlog of outstanding
warrants.73 The officer’s,
sole reason for stopping Strieff, [the officer]
acknowledged, was investigative—he wanted to discover
whether drug activity was going on in the house . . . . The
warrant check . . . was not an “intervening circumstance”
separating the stop from the search for drugs. It was part
and parcel of the officer’s illegal “expedition for evidence
in the hope that something might turn up.”74
Justice Sotomayor concluded that the majority’s view that a
warrant would “clean up whatever illegal conduct uncovered it”
was a “remarkable proposition.”75
Justice Kagan agreed with this view of intervening
circumstances. She asserted that checking for warrants during
stops was a routine procedure in Salt Lake City, and that the
standard stop procedures were “partly designed to find
outstanding warrants;”76 “[a]nd find them they will, given the
staggering number of such warrants on the books.”77 As Justice
Kagan noted, the attenuation doctrine embodies the concept of
proximate cause. The question is whether there is an intervening
circumstance that breaks the causal chain between the illegality
and the evidence.78 She explained that in proximate cause
analysis, “a circumstance is intervening only when it is
unforeseeable.”79 Given the numbers of outstanding warrants and
the routine procedure of the police to conduct checks when
stopping individuals, the officer’s discovery of the warrant here

71. Id. at 4.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 5 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 606 (1975).
75. Id. at 5−6.
76. Id. at 5 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. Justice Kagan also cites examples from other jurisdictions with
large numbers of outstanding warrants. Id.
78. Id. at 4.
79. Id.
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was “eminently foreseeable.”80 She elaborated:
So outstanding warrants do not appear as bolts from the
blue. They are the run-of-the-mill results of police stops—
what officers look for when they run a routine check of a
person’s identification and what they know will turn up
with fair regularity. In short, they are nothing like what
intervening circumstances are supposed to be.81
Though both dissenting opinions appeared to agree with the
majority that the attenuation doctrine was applicable to the facts
of this case, they interpreted the “intervening circumstance” far
differently from the Court. While they did not go as far as the
Utah Supreme Court in finding that this circumstance had to be
an act of the defendant’s free will,82 they did agree that the
evidence must be obtained in a way that was not exploitive of the
illegality that preceded it.83 This view is consistent with the
Court’s prior understanding of the three related exclusionary rule
exceptions: the independent source doctrine allows evidence to be
admitted because the police did not exploit the initial illegality but
obtained it from a lawful, independent source; the inevitable
discovery doctrine allows evidence to be admitted because the
police did not exploit the initial illegality but inevitably would
have obtained it from a lawful independent source; and the
attenuation doctrine allows evidence to be admitted because the
police did not exploit the initial illegality but derived the evidence
through an independent intervening circumstance that therefore
dissipated the taint of the illegal conduct. This makes sense when
one considers that the Court has focused on deterrence as the sole
rationale for the exclusionary rule. If the police are not exploiting
the illegal conduct to obtain evidence, there is no deterrence
purpose for excluding this evidence. To put it conversely, the
exclusion of evidence will deter the police from committing illegal
acts, if they are exploiting this illegality to obtain the evidence.
The Strieff Court, consistent with earlier cases, made clear
that deterrence of police misconduct was the sole purpose of the
exclusionary rule. As the Court stated, “[t]he exclusionary rule

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1.
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exists to deter police misconduct.”84 Therefore, even under the
Court’s rationale for the exclusionary rule, the admissibility of the
evidence in this case does not fit into the attenuation exception
and does not make sense. By grouping this kind of intervening
circumstance into the attenuation exception, the Court has
measurably expanded the doctrine. Further, it has become
unhinged from the rationale that supported it.
B. Purpose, Flagrancy, and Good Faith
Justice Thomas spent the most time on the third factor in the
Brown analysis: whether the officer’s conduct was purposeful and
flagrant.85 This is critical to the majority because without such
behavior, there is no possible deterrence of police misconduct to be
achieved by exclusion of the evidence, and therefore no purpose for
doing so.86
The Court found that Officer Fackrell’s conduct in this case
was not purposeful and flagrant.87 Justice Thomas stated that
the officer was “at most negligent” and made two “good-faith
mistakes” in stopping the defendant.88 First, he did not know how
long Strieff had been at the house, and so he did not have a
sufficient reason to conclude that Strieff was a short-term visitor
who may have been involved in a drug deal. Second, because he
did not have that reason, he “should have asked Strieff whether
he would speak with him, instead of demanding that Strieff do
so.”89 Further, the “mistaken” stop was followed by lawful
conduct—the arrest based on the warrant and the search incident
to arrest.90
Justice Thomas’ use of the phrase good faith is noteworthy; in
the context of the exclusionary rule, these words connote the “good
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id.
86. Id. (“The third factor of the attenuation doctrine reflects that
[deterrence] rationale by favoring exclusion only when the police misconduct
is most in need of deterrence—that is, when it is purposeful or flagrant.”); see
also Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (“To trigger the
exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that
exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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faith exception” developed in United States v. Leon.91 There, the
officers had relied on a warrant issued by a magistrate, which was
later determined to be invalid.92 The Court ruled that because the
officers had reasonably relied in good faith on this warrant, the
evidence that the warrant-based search had uncovered should not
be excluded.93 Since the officers did not and reasonably could not
have known that the warrant would turn out to be invalid, their
behavior was “in good faith.”94 But here, Justice Thomas equated
a negligent mistake with good faith. The point of Leon was that
the police themselves did not engage in any unreasonable
behavior; under the Court’s reasoning in that case, there would
therefore be nothing to deter.95 But such is not the case here; by
definition, the concededly illegal stop was unreasonable and
Officer Fackrell’s failure to recognize that was not a “good faith
exception” as used in exclusionary rule doctrine.
Further, Justice Sotomayor took issue with the majority’s
characterization of the officer’s illegal conduct as simply negligent,
and in good faith in a more general meaning of the term. She
argued instead that his unlawful conduct was deliberate and
purposeful because his “sole purpose was to fish for evidence.”96
In her dissent, Justice Kagan also pointed out that “far from a
Barney Fife-type mishap, Fackrell’s seizure of Strieff was a
calculated decision, taken with so little justification that the State

91. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 922 (1984).
92. Id. at 903.
93. Id. at 922.
94. Id. at 919–21 (“[W]here the officer’s conduct is objectively
reasonable, ‘excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the
exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that . . .
the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar
circumstances’. . . . This is particularly true, we believe, when an officer
acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge
or magistrate and acted within its scope. In most such cases, there is no
police illegality and thus nothing to deter.”) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 539–40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
95. See id.
96. Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at 7 (U.S. June 20, 2016)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor also argued that even
assuming this conduct could be considered negligent, negligence can be
deterred by the exclusionary rule, and in fact may be “most in need of the
education” gained through exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. Id.
Therefore, counter to the Court’s argument, there is real deterrence to be
gained by excluding the evidence in these circumstances even if we accepted
the Justice Thomas’ characterization of the officer’s behavior.
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has never tried to defend its legality.”97 Officer Fackrell’s own
testimony at the suppression hearing made clear that the stop had
an investigatory purpose; he said it was to find out what was
going on in the house and what Strieff was doing there, and he
admitted that he had no basis for the stop other than the fact that
Strieff was exiting the house in question.98
Justice Thomas countered that the officer was actually
stopping Strieff to find out what was happening inside a house
where he legitimately suspected drug activity, and so this was not
a “suspicionless fishing expedition.”99 Justice Thomas seemed to
assume therefore that the illegal conduct did not meet the
purposeful and flagrant standard.
There are several problems with this assumption. First,
Justice Thomas conflated the suspicion the officers may have had
about the home with that necessary to detain Strieff. A stop
requires individualized reasonable suspicion that the person
detained is committing a crime.100 Even assuming that the officer
did have reasonable suspicion that drug activity was transpiring
in the home, he still required separate reasonable suspicion to
believe that Strieff was involved in that activity. The officer could
have tried to ask Strieff to provide information consensually as he
apparently did upon his initial contact. However, he could not
detain him under the Fourth Amendment, as all concede he did
when he immediately asked for and retained Strieff’s
identification in order to conduct the warrant check, unless he had
the required reasonable suspicion about Strieff himself. This the
officer clearly did not have. As the State conceded, the officer did
not know how long Strieff had been in the home, did not know who
he was, and Strieff had done nothing suspicious upon exiting the
home and walking toward a nearby convenience store.101 As
Justice Sotomayor put it, “[t]he officer did not suspect that Strieff
had done anything wrong. Strieff just happened to be the first
person to leave a house that the officer thought might contain
97. Id. at 3 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
98. Id. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975) (finding the illegal
arrest at issue purposeful because it was “investigatory”). As Brown stated,
“[t]he detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that
something might turn up.”). Id.
99. Strieff, slip op. at 9.
100. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (emphasis added).
101. State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536–37 (Utah 2015).
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‘drug activity.’”102 Even assuming the officer was looking only for
information about the home, because the officer had no knowledge
of the length or reason for Strieff’s visit and he obviously lacked
the necessary suspicion, the detention was in fact a “suspicionless
fishing expedition.”
Second, it seems highly implausible that the police officer
only wanted information about the home and did not view Strieff
himself as a potential suspect. The two beliefs are connected;
clearly he thought Strieff might have information about drug
activity because he thought that Strieff may have been a shortstay visitor who was a drug purchaser. Most important, the
immediate warrant check belies Justice Thomas’s assumption that
the officer was interested only in obtaining information from
Strieff about the home. Clearly the warrant check would enable
the officer to investigate Strieff as a suspect himself and
determine whether he had a basis to detain or arrest him. Though
Justice Thomas characterized this check as a “negligibly
burdensome” safety precaution,103 there is no basis for this belief,
either factually or legally. There was no reason for the officer to
fear for his safety.104 Strieff merely had walked from the house to
the convenience store, and he readily complied when the officer
ordered him to stop.105 Further, it is hornbook law that an officer
cannot justify a further Fourth Amendment intrusion based on his
fear of the defendant, when he had no basis to approach the
defendant in the first place.106 In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor
commented that, “[s]urely we would not allow officers to warrant102. Strieff, slip op. at 1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 8 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616
(2015)).
104. In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the officer, by his
own account, did not fear Strieff. Strieff, slip op. at. 6 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
105. See Strieff, 357 P.3d at 536–37.
106. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., 2 CRIM. PROC. § 3.8(e) (4th ed. 2015)
(“In determining the lawfulness of a frisk, two matters are to be considered:
(i) whether the officer was rightly in the presence of the party frisked so as to
be endangered if that person was armed; and (ii) whether the officer had a
sufficient degree of suspicion that the party frisked was armed and
dangerous. As to the first, Justice Harlan helpfully commented in his
separate Terry opinion that if ‘a policeman has a right . . . to disarm a person
for his own protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him but to be in
his presence.’ Thus a mere bulge in a pedestrian’s pocket, insufficient to
justify a stopping for investigation, would not be a basis for a frisk by a
passing officer.”).
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check random joggers, dog walkers, and lemonade vendors just to
ensure they pose no threat to anyone else.”107 This was a
purposeful investigative detention blatantly without any
reasonable suspicion.108
Nevertheless, according to the Court, the conduct of the officer
also was not purposeful or flagrant because it did not indicate
“any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.”109 This echoes
language in Herring v. United States, where the Court held the
exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence obtained in an illegal
arrest which was due to an error in a police database, since it was
“the result of isolated negligence,” rather than a systemic
problem.110
Justice Sotomayor took particular issue with the majority’s
view that the illegal conduct in this case was only an isolated
occurrence; “[r]espectfully, nothing about this case is isolated.”111
She pointed out that there are over 7.8 million outstanding
warrants in this country, mostly for minor offenses such as failure
to pay a traffic fine, a missed court appearance, or curfew or
alcohol violations for probationers.112 Justice Sotomayor provided
the example of Ferguson, Missouri, where 16,000 people out of a
total population of 21,000 had outstanding warrants against
107. Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at 16 (U.S. June 20, 2016)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
108. See id., at 12 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that an officer
violates the Fourth Amendment when he detains an individual to check his
license without any evidence that the person is engaged in crime, and
“deepens the breach when he prolongs the detention just to fish further for
evidence of wrongdoing”).
109. Strieff, slip op. at 8.
110. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009). In another
context, Justice Kennedy had pointed out the importance of systemic
violations to the application of the exclusionary rule. In Hudson v. Michigan,
he concurred in the decision not to suppress evidence obtained after a
violation of the constitutional knock and announce rule. 547 U.S. 586, 602-04
(Kennedy J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Today’s
decision does not address any demonstrated pattern of knock-and-announce
violations. If a widespread pattern of violations were shown, and particularly
if those violations were committed against persons who lacked the means or
the voice to mount an effective protest, there would be reason for grave
concern.”). Apparently, in this case, Justice Kennedy, who joined the
majority opinion, agreed that there was no systemic violation, despite the
concerns raised by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor in their dissents. See supra
notes 77-81 and infra notes 111-19, and accompanying text.
111. Strieff, slip op. at 7 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
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them.113 She pointed out that police can and do stop people
without cause by using these outstanding warrants.114 Citing
U.S. Justice Department investigations, she noted that in the St.
Louis metropolitan area, officers routinely stop people for no
reason other than an officer’s desire to check for pending
warrants.115 In Newark, New Jersey, officers stopped 52,335
pedestrians within a four-year period, and ran warrant checks on
39,308 of them.116 The Justice Department analysis of the stops
where warrant checks were performed found that approximately
93% of them “‘would have been considered unsupported by
articulated reasonable suspicion.’”117 And, though most officers
may not set out to violate the law, “this does not mean that these
stops are ‘isolated instance[s] of negligence.’”118
Justice
Sotomayor contended that many of these illegal stops are actually
the result of institutionalized training procedures, which teach
police to ‘“stop and question first, develop reasonable suspicion
later.’”119
Justice Thomas ultimately had to concede that the stop was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, but he argued that this did
not mean it rose to the level of being flagrant; “[f]or the violation
to be flagrant, more severe police misconduct is required than the
mere absence of proper cause for the seizure.”120 While that
statement is accurate, it doesn’t answer the arguments made by
the dissenting justices that the stop that occurred here involved
more than the “mere absence of proper cause.”121 The majority
opinion never takes on the real implications of the type of
unconstitutional stop at issue here; it was a purposeful
investigatory detention without any legal basis, and part of a
pattern of police misconduct—i.e., a flagrant violation. Justice
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8-9 (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV.,
INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT, 8, 19, n. 7 (2014),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/07/22/newark_findin
gs_7-22-14.pdf.).
118. Id. at 9 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion at 8).
119. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Ligon v. New York, 925 F.
Supp. 2d 478, 537-38 (S.D.N.Y.)) stay granted on other grounds, 736 F.3d 118
(2d Cir. 2013)) (discussing New York City Police Department training).
120. Id. at 8.
121. Id.
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Thomas simply found that “[n]either the officer’s purpose nor the
flagrancy of the violation rise to a level of misconduct to warrant
suppression.”122
Weighing all the factors, the Court held that the evidence was
admissible because its discovery was sufficiently attenuated from
the illegal stop by the arrest warrant.123 Although the temporal
proximity factor was in favor of the defendant, it was outweighed
by the other two factors. The arrest warrant was an intervening
circumstance that was “wholly independent” from the illegal stop,
“compelling” Officer Fackrell to arrest Strieff.124 And, the Court
found it “especially significant” that the officer’s misconduct did
not “reflect flagrantly unlawful police misconduct.”125
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO EXCLUDE THE EVIDENCE

In her strenuous dissent, Justice Sotomayor immediately
made clear the substantial implications of the Court’s decision.
Addressing the audience directly, she began her dissent:
The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant for
an unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer’s
violation of your Fourth Amendment rights. Do not be
soothed by the opinion’s technical language: This case
allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your
identification, and check it for outstanding traffic
warrants—even if you are doing nothing wrong. If the
officer discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay,
courts will now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into
evidence anything he happens to find by searching you
after arresting you on the warrant.126
The Court gave only minimal consideration to Justice
Sotomayor’s concerns. In a paragraph near the end of his opinion,
Justice Thomas stated that it is “unlikely” that police will engage
in dragnet searches if the exclusionary rule is not applied in the
situation raised by this case.127 Such conduct would expose the
police to civil lawsuits, and further, the “purpose and flagrancy”
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Strieff, slip op. at 10.
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prong of attenuation doctrine would act as a limitation; “[w]ere
evidence of a dragnet search presented here, the application of the
Brown factors could be different.”128
But as Justice Kagan pointed out in her dissent, the
majority’s opinion created what she termed “unfortunate
incentives” for the police, and “practically invites them to do what
Fackrell did here.”129 Though her tone differed from that of
Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan agreed that the Court has not
considered the implications of its ruling, which are counter to the
precise goal of the exclusionary rule it espouses. Justice Kagan
appeared to agree with the majority that deterrence is the purpose
of the rule.130 Noting that a rule excluding the evidence obtained
in circumstances like this would achieve exactly this result, she
pointed out that the majority’s decision will have the opposite
result. As long as the detained individual is one of the many
millions of people with an outstanding arrest warrant, any
evidence uncovered in an illegal stop is now “fair game for use in a
criminal prosecution.”131 Therefore, the officer’s incentive to
violate the Fourth Amendment increases, since there is now a
potential advantage to stopping without reasonable suspicion—
“exactly the temptation the exclusionary rule is supposed to
remove.”132
But Justice Sotomayor went further. In a part of her dissent
not joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor made a direct
and explicit link between illegal stops, the failure to exclude
evidence obtained from them, and relations between the police
and the community.
In a comprehensive critique, Justice Sotomayor first provided
a litany of all the lawful powers that “this Court has given
officers . . . to probe and examine” people.133 An officer can stop
an individual “for whatever reason he wants—so long as he can
point to a pretextual justification after the fact.”134
That
135
justification may factor in your ethnicity,
where you live,136
128. Id.
129. Id. at 6 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1 (“The exclusionary rule serves a crucial function—to deter
unconstitutional police conduct.”).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 6.
133. Id. at 10 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
135. Id. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87
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what you were wearing,137 and how you behaved.138 The officer
does not even have to know what law you may have violated, if he
later can justify the stop based on “any possible infraction—even
one that is minor, unrelated, or ambiguous.”139 Further, the
officer may ask you for your “consent” to search without telling
you that you have a right to refuse.140 If he thinks you might be
dangerous, he can frisk you,141 and if you have violated even a
minor crime such as driving without your seatbelt, he can
handcuff you and take you to jail.142 At the jail, the officer can
fingerprint you, swab DNA, and make you shower with a
delousing agent. 143 Your arrest record will provide you with the
“civil death” of discrimination by employers and landlords.144
After this powerful rendition of the consequences of a lawful
stop, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that this case involved a
“suspicionless stop, one in which the officer initiated this chain of
events without justification.”145 And, Justice Sotomayor noted, it
is people of color that are disproportionately impacted by these
types of illegal stops.146
(1975)).
136. Id. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)).
137. Id. (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1989)).
138. Id. (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)).
139. Id. (citing Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U. S. 146, 154–55 (2004); Heien
v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014)).
140. Id. (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991)). The
quotations around consent are Justice Sotomayor’s.
141. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1, 17 (1968)).
142. Id. at 11 (citing Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323–24 (2001)).
143. Id. (citing Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of
Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1514 (2012)); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958,
1980 (2013)).
144. Id. (citing Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking
Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1805
(2012)).
145. Id. (emphasis in original). Though her focus in this dissent is on
illegal police conduct, her comprehensive review of the massive legal powers
of law enforcement suggests that she may believe that the Court’s criminal
procedure jurisprudence has gone too far in supporting state intervention and
control over individual rights.
146. Id. at 12.
In his foundational 1974 article on the Fourth
Amendment, Professor Anthony Amsterdam presciently commented that
“[t]he pressures upon policemen to use the stop-and-frisk power as a device
for exploratory evidence searches in [urban areas] are intense. Police can
justify virtually any exercise of the power because these are the ‘high-crime’
areas where all young males, at least, are suspect.” Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 438 (1974).
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In strong language, she explained how the Court’s ruling in
this case legitimized this type of illegal conduct and told all
individuals that “your body is subject to invasion while courts
excuse the violation of your rights. It implied that you are not a
citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just
waiting to be catalogued.”147 Justice Sotomayor’s view of the
Court’s complicity in this violation is consistent with the different
vision of the purpose of the exclusionary rule that she expressed
earlier in the dissent. After noting the rule’s deterrence purpose,
she said, “[i]t also keeps courts from being ‘made party to lawless
invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting
unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.’”148
When courts admit illegally obtained evidence, “they reward
‘manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the
Constitution.’”149 By reviving the early judicial integrity rationale
for the exclusionary rule, Justice Sotomayor made clear that it is
not only police, but also the judiciary that is responsible for this
denigration of citizens’ rights.
Justice Sotomayor’s position speaks to her obvious concern for
the state of police-community relations in this country. Both in
her dissent and at the oral argument in the case, she invoked the
example of Ferguson, Missouri, the site of protests and unrest in
2014 after the fatal shooting of Michael Brown, an eighteen-yearold African-American, by a white police officer.150 At the oral
Professor Amsterdam had co-authored with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
and the ACLU an amicus brief in Terry v. Ohio, which had argued that the
Court should utilize the probable cause standard for stop and frisks. See
Tracey Maclin, Anthony Amsterdam’s Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
and What it Teaches About the Good and the Bad in Rodriguez v. United
States, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1939, 1941–42, n.9 (2016) (discussing Amsterdam’s
brief) (citing Brief for NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67), 1967 WL 113672)).
Professor Maclin further discusses recent litigation in New York, in which a
federal judge found that the New York City Police Department’s stop and
frisk practices violated the rights of blacks and Hispanics. Id. at 1939, 1942,
n.13 (citing Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
147. Strieff, slip op. at 12 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 3 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968)).
149. Id. (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 393, 394 (1914)).
150. Id. at 8 (discussing the outstanding numbers of warrants in
Ferguson); Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373,
slip op. (U.S. 2016) (“If you have a town like Ferguson, where 80 percent of
the residents have minor traffic warrants out, there may be a very good
incentive for just standing on the street corner in Ferguson and asking every
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argument, addressing the attorney for the State, she said:
Don’t you think it’s enough of a deterrence to say to a
police officer in this situation, you should have reasonable
suspicion? You know the Fourth Amendment requires it.
So before you do an intrusive act demanding
identification, you do what you’re permitted to do, which
is just to ask the person whether they’ll talk to you. Don’t
you think that would improve the relationship between the
public and the police? Wouldn’t that be the appropriate
encouragement we would give, if we don’t let police do
these things in questionable situations?151
For Justice Sotomayor, the concern of what may follow from
the Court’s decision is very real. At one point in the oral
argument, she noted that the brief of either the State or the
amicus brief of the Justice Department had said, “the public will
stop this if they don’t like police stopping you with no cause.”152
On a somewhat ominous note, she then commented, “I think the
public may end up stopping things but in a way the police are not
going to like.”153
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor explained that the illegal
conduct harms not just its immediate victims, but all of us. The
people targeted by police are the “canaries in the coal mine,”
telling us that illegal police stops “corrode all our civil liberties
and threaten all our lives. Until their voices matter too, our
justice system will continue to be anything but.”154
CONCLUSION

In Utah v. Strieff, the Court dealt a further blow to the
exclusionary rule. It professed to be applying existing attenuation
doctrine. However, its finding that an outstanding warrant
discovered through exploitation of an illegal stop serves as an
citizen, give me your ID; let me see your name. And let me hope, because I
have an 80 percent chance that you’re going to have a warrant.”).
151.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373,
slip op. (U.S. 2016) (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 20.
153. Id.
154. Strieff, slip op. at 12 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing L. GUINIER &
G. TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY 274–78 (2002)). Justice Sotomayor closed
her dissent with the words “I dissent,” omitting the traditional “respectfully.”
Id. at 12.
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“intervening circumstance” which can dissipate the taint of
unconstitutional police conduct signals a new and broad reading of
the attenuation exception.155 The Court’s characterization of
deliberate police misconduct as “good faith negligence” and thus
not “purposeful and flagrant” illegality further demonstrates its
willingness to expand the exception and constrict the application
of the exclusionary rule.156 The Court did not eliminate the
exclusionary rule entirely, but its decision in Utah v. Strieff may
indicate that it is dying a slow death of attrition.
But it is Justice Sotomayor’s dissent that remains most in the
mind after reading Utah v. Strieff. She understands that the
context of this case, the routine stops and warrant checks that
happen all over this country multiple times each day, makes the
Court’s limitations on the exclusionary rule particularly
significant. She insists on grounding Fourth Amendment law in
the realities of public experience, and calls upon us to recognize
the impact that police overreaching and judicial condonation of
that conduct has on our citizenry.

155.
156.

See id. at 6.
See id. at 8, 9.

